On March 26, 2010, North Korea attacked the South Korean vessel Cheonan, killing 46 people and making it one of the deadliest encounters in Korea in recent years. This attack followed a year of mounting tensions in which Pyongyang tested the first stage of a long-range missile in the guise of putting a satellite into orbit and then conducted its second underground nuclear test. Following the attack, the Obama administration backed South KoreaÕs decision to punish North Korea with tough trade sanctions. The author writes that this was not necessarily a wise move, as punitive measures, however justifiable, will be met tit-for-tat by North Korea. Pyongyang reacted to the July 2006 U.N. Security Council sanctions for its missile tests, the author writes, by conducting a nuclear test; its response to tougher U.N. sanctions in June 2009 for its second nuclear test was to reprocess more plutonium. The author looks at recent interactions, discussions, and disputes among North Korea, South Korea, and the United States, and writes that the only way to make the waters off Korea safer and to stop further nuclear proliferation is to resume the Six-Party Talks soon, negotiate in earnest, and start a parallel peace process for the Korea.
I
n the last two years the situation on the Korean Peninsula has gone from somewhat hopeful to dangerously bad. On March 26, 2010, North Korea sank a South Korean Navy corvette, the Cheonan, killing 46 people, the deadliest encounter in Korea in two decades. This attack followed a year of mounting tensions in which Pyongyang tested the first stage of a long-range missile in the guise of putting a satellite into orbit and then conducted its second underground nuclear test.
North Korea earns its fair share of media headlines and op-ed criticisms for its nuclear ambitions, adversarial behavior, over-the-top rhetoric, and human rights abuses. Yet North KoreaÕs attention-grabbing behaviorÑthe missile and nuclear tests, the attack on the CheonanÑhas obscured South KoreaÕs role. For example, at SixParty Talks in 2007, North Korea promised to disable its plutonium facility in exchange for energy aid provided by South Korea (among others). When South Korea reneged, North Korea responded with missile and nuclear tests in the spring of 2009. The Cheonan attack was also a case of action and reaction. North Korea carried out the attack to avenge the destruction of one of its ships by South Korea last November.
Predictably, most accounts have focused on North KoreaÕs actions; oddly, they have ignored the obvious causes and focused on the opaque, attributing the Cheonan attack to internal motives. Kim Jong-il, it was said, was shoring up the shaky succession of his son Kim Jong-un with a show of force, or the regime was distracting the North Korean people from its own economic malfeasance.
What little is known about North Korea does not support these claims. Its leadership transition seems to be proceeding smoothly, with no signs of a succession struggle. And far from being on the ropes, the NorthÕs economy has been growing for 9 of the past 10 years, along with its foreign trade, according to South Korean data. The gross domestic product even grew about 3.7 percent in 2008 and 2009Ñyears that were not good elsewhere.
While ÒNorth Korea is on the verge of collapseÓ has been a conventional narrative in Washington for two decades, it has recently been bolstered by a South Korean disinformation campaignÑone that deflects attention from SeoulÕs role in spurring PyongyangÕs misbehavior.
The attack on the Cheonan is not an incident that can be assessed on its own. To understand that deadly day in March requires first understanding the relationships among North Korea, South Korea, and the United States.
Pyongyang's strategy
Since the late 1980s, PyongyangÕs aim has been to get Washington to end enmity and reconcile, and it has used its nuclear weapon programs both as bait and bludgeon to achieve that aim. Progress has come when Washington and Seoul have moved in tandem to reconcile with Pyongyang. The worst crisesÑin March 1993, when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), and May 1994, when the country abruptly removed its spent nuclear fuel rods from the reactor at YongbyonÑoccurred after Seoul successfully impeded reconciliation between the United States and North Korea. Hardliners in Seoul have regarded any improvement in relations between Washington and Pyongyang with suspicion and have sought to impede engagement, which was the case in late 1992, late 1993, and early 1994. North Korea has reacted badly to U.S. disengagement, especially when it saw the United States as following South KoreaÕs leadÑand that is the case today.
By escalating tensions and raising the stakes, Pyongyang is underscoring its need for Washington to re-engageÑwhile at the same time strengthening its negotiating position. What the United States risks in resisting engagement is that Pyongyang could be prompted to make more plutonium by restarting its nuclear reactor at Yongbyon (which was shut down in 2007) and to conduct more nuclear and missile tests.
A high point in engaging the North
October 2007 marked a high point in engagement when North and South Korea held their second-ever summit meeting, which yielded a potentially farreaching accord extending economic relations. At the same time, the Six-Party Talks involving North Korea, South Korea, the United States, China, Russia, and Japan yielded an agreement on the second phase of denuclearization; North Korea pledged to provide Òa complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programsÓ and to disable its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, thereby making it more difficult and time-consuming to resume plutonium production. In return, the other parties committed to provide North Korea with energy aid, and the United States promised to relax sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act and to take North Korea off its list of state sponsors of terrorism. Nothing was said about verification to assess the accuracy of North KoreaÕs declaration, which was left to a later phase of denuclearization.
Two months later, South Korea elected a president, Lee Myung-bak, who was determined to get tough with the North in the belief that Pyongyang would become more pliable under pressure of sanctions and isolation. In an effort to impede Washington from moving to end enmity and seek peace with Pyongyang, Lee jettisoned the ÒSunshine PolicyÓ of his predecessors, which since 1999 had encouraged engagement between North and South Korea and earned former South Korean President Kim Dae-jung the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. SeoulÕs change of heart was conspicuous at the Six-Party Talks.
Seoul stalls the Six-Party Talks
When President George W. Bush took office in 2001, North Korea had enough plutonium for one or two nuclear weapons, had verifiably frozen its plutonium program, had not conducted a nuclear test, and was observing a moratorium on longer-range missile tests. BushÕs confrontational strategy led the North to unfreeze its plutonium program and make six to eight weapons. That prompted the administration to enter into Six-Party Talks, which eventually yielded a September 2005 Joint Statement in which North Korea committed to Òabandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.Ó In return, the other parties promised energy aid; the United States and Japan pledged to normalize relations with the North; and the United States, South Korea, and North Korea committed to negotiating peace on the peninsula. After U.S. financial sanctions derailed engagement and led to the NorthÕs first nuclear test, the Six-Party Talks resumed, producing agreements in In June 2008, North Korea declared that it had separated 38 kilograms of plutoniumÑan amount that was at the lower end of U.S. intelligence estimates. In a side agreement with Washington, Pyongyang pledged to reveal its uranium enrichment and proliferation efforts, including its help for SyriaÕs nuclear reactor. Many in Washington questioned whether the declaration was Òcomplete and correct.Ó So did Seoul and Tokyo.
The day that Pyongyang turned over its declaration, the White House announced its intention to fulfill its obligations, but with a caveat: North Korea had to cooperate on verification. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice acknowledged Washington was moving the goalposts: ÒWhat weÕve done, in a sense, is move up issues that were to be taken up in phase three, like verification, like access to the reactor, into phase twoÓ (Rice, 2008 With the disablement in jeopardy, U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill, armed with a revised draft protocol, flew to Pyongyang to meet with his counterpart, Kim Gye Gwan. Stopping short of accepting it, Kim agreed to allow Òsam-pling and other forensic measuresÓ at the three declared sites at Yongbyon: the reactor, reprocessing plant, and fuel fabrication plant. This should have been enough to ascertain how much plutonium North Korea had produced, but in case it was not, he also agreed to Òaccess, based on mutual consent, to undeclared sitesÓ (U.S. State Department, 2008a).
Again, an oral commitment was not good enough for South Korea or Japan; they insisted it be put in writing. Nevertheless, in mid-October 2008 President Bush delisted North Korea as a sponsor of terrorism, much to the dismay of Tokyo.
Disabling the reactor at Yongbyon resumed with nearly 60 percent of the 8,000 fuel rods unloaded from the reactor, but the question of how to dispose of the nuclear fuel remained unanswered. Only half of the energy aid promised to North Korea in return for disabling its reactor had been delivered: Japan maintained that it would not contribute its share of energy aid unless Pyongyang first reinvestigated the abductions of Japanese citizens in the 1970s and 1980s.
South Korea now sided with Japan, insisting that aid deliveries be suspended unless North Korea accepted more intrusive verification. The allies persuaded the United States to go along. The issue came to a head at the seventh round of the Six-Party Talks in December 2008. There was no disguising the threat posed by the United States, South Korea, and Japan that, unless North Korea accepted a written protocol on verification, energy aid shipments would be stopped. North KoreaÕs envoy, Kim Gye Gwan, made it clear that the North would retaliate for any reneging on energy aid: ÒWeÕll adjust the speed of our disablement work if it doesnÕt come in.Ó
Obama picks up where Bush left off
As a presidential hopeful, Barack Obama said he would be willing to meet without (Reuters, 2009) . The Security Council then imposed new sanctions on three North Korean firms involved in missile trading.
PyongyangÕs reaction was all too predictable (Sigal, 2009) . Noting that Japan and others had tested space launch vehicles (but leaving unsaid that South Korea planned a launch that summer), North KoreaÕs Foreign Ministry rejected the Security Council action and listed four steps it would take in response. Denouncing the SixParty Talks as having turned into Òan arena which infringes upon our sovereignty and which aims only at disarming us and overthrowing our system,Ó the ministry spokesman said, Pyongyang Òwill no longer be bound to any agreement.Ó (This called into question North KoreaÕs commitment in a September 2005 Six-Party joint statement to Òaban-don all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs.Ó) Second, Òwe will actively examine the construction of a light-water reactor plant of our own,Ó ostensibly a threat to enrich uranium to fuel it, which could take years. Third, the Yongbyon nuclear facilities Òwill be restored to the original state for normal operation.Ó He stopped just short of saying the reactor would be restarted, which could have been accomplished in months, if not weeks. Fourth, the 6,500 spent fuel rods removed during disabling Òwill be reprocessedÓ (Korean Central News Agency, 2009b) . Extracting another bombÕs worth of plutonium put Pyongyang in position to conduct another nuclear test without further depleting its stock of plutonium, a test it carried out in May 2009.
Demolishing a bridge over Korea's troubled waters
The new government in Seoul did more than impede the Six-Party Talks and U.S.-North Korean engagement. It challenged Pyongyang directly in the contested waters off the Korean coast.
At the end of the Korean War in 1953, a sea boundary was unilaterally imposed by the allies north of the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) on land. North Korea has long rejected this socalled Northern Limit Line (NLL), which is also not recognized internationally, in favor of an extension of the MDL seaward.
At the October 2007 South-North summit meeting, LeeÕs predecessor, Roh Moo-hyun, signed a wide-ranging accord with North KoreaÕs Kim Jong-il that offered a way around the NLL dispute by pledging Òto discuss ways of designating a joint fishing area in the West [Yellow] Sea to avoid accidental clashes and turning it into a peace area and also to discuss measures to build military confidenceÓ (North-South Declaration, 2007) .
Within days of LeeÕs election, however, his transition team backed away from this provision (Jung, 2007 All these initiatives came to naught. President Lee killed off the potential summit meeting and specified denuclearization as a prerequisite for major aid, saying, ÒIf North Korea demonstrates a willingness to change, we will offer supportÓ (Chosun Ilbo, 2009b) . Seoul also backed away from the deal to resume tours at Mount Kumgang. BosworthÕs visit was delayed until December; and with no commitment from Seoul to resume shipments of energy aid, he could do little more than reiterate long-standing U.S. positions on the need to resume the Six-Party Talks and denuclearize in return for improved relations.
North Korea takes its revenge on the Cheonan
With little to stay his hand, Kim Jong-il turned up the heat. In October 2009, the North Korean Navy released a report accusing the South of sending 16 warships into the contested waters, according to North KoreaÕs state-run Korean Central News Agency, which noted, ÒThe reckless military provocations by warships of the South Korean navy have created such a serious situation that naval clash may break out between the two sides in these watersÓ (Korean Central News Agency, 2009d) .
On November 9, the two navies exchanged hostile fire. When a North Korean patrol boat crossed the NLL, the South fired warning shots at it. The North returned fire, and the South opened up, crippling the North Korean vessel and causing an unknown number of casualties. North Korea demanded an apology from the South, which did not respond.
On November 12, North KoreaÕs party newspaper, Rodong Sinmun, talked about avenging the attack: ÒThe South Korean forces will be forced to pay dearly for the grave armed provocation perpetrated by them in the waters of the north side in the West Sea of KoreaÓ (Korean Central News Agency, 2009e). Five days later, Kim Jong-il went to a naval base with his military high command and, according to North Korean accounts, ordered the navy to train a Òdo-or-die unit of sea heroesÓ (Lee and Ser, 2010) . With the March 2010 attack on the Cheonan, just south of the contested waters, KimÕs orders were carried out.
